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REPLIES
IN RE: This Issue, Gruber's review of Schwartz's
Judaism and Vegetarianism

Judaism and Veget<;rrianlsm is a
polemic that argues that based on
Jewish values, people should be vege
tarians.
Its message can be summed
up by the question with which I end
the book:
I n view of the. strong Jewish
mandates to be compassionate
to animals, preserve health,
help feed the hungry, pre
serve and protect the environ
ment, and seek and pursue
peace and the very negative
effects
flesh-centered
diets
have in each of these areas,
how do you justify not becom
ing a vegetarian?
While he states that he is a vege
tarian,
Rabbi
Marc
Alan
Gruber
apparently is determined to convince
people that they need not be vegeta
rians based on religious values.
To
do this he has written a review of my
book that is filled with inaccurate and
misleading statements and implications.
Gruber's answer to the inhumane
excesses of factory farming is to elim
inate objectionable practices.
Some
how he neglects to tell us how to do
th is. Does he ex pect those who ra ise
animals to forget their economic inter
ests and be more considerate of ani
mals?
With rega rd to health, Gruber is
evidently
u nawa re
of the
strong
recent evidence Ii nki ng meat-centered
diets to heart attacks, many types of
cancer,
and
other diseases.
His
assertion that "Even if the medical
evidence indicates that a vegetarian
diet wou Id increase ou r longevity, it
is unfounded that the human life span
would increase by 800 years or more,"

completely distorts my statement (pp.
2,3) that "Of course, a shift to a
sensible
vegetarian
diet
will
not
increase life spans to anywhere near
those of early people, but r'ecent
medical evidence indicates
that it
would lead to an increase in the aver'
age span of life."
Gr'uber's assertion that I do not
define what is "natural" regarding the
human diet conveniently overlooks the
discussion on pages 35 and 36 and the
table on page 37 which clearly show
that biologically we are closest to fruit
eating
animals.
He
conveniently
ignores 7 out of the 8 anatomical simi
larities given.
Also, the fact that
peole have developed tools
wh ich
enable us to slaughter animals and
p repa re meat to eat does not mea n
that it is natural for" us to eat meat,
any more than the wor"ld's cut'rent
arsenal of 50,000 nuclear weapons
makes the production of such arma
ments natu ral.
Gruber, similarly, downplays the
effects that a switch to vegeta ria n
diets could have in reducing the
scandal of global hunger. He conven
iently ignores the many statistics in
my book which show just how wasteful
of grain, land, water, fuel, pesti
cides,
and
fertilizer meat-centered
diets are. While Gruber is correct in
stating
that
hunger
is
primarily
related to the distribution of food and
wealth, he overlooks my statement
that, after people shifted to vegeta
rian diets, "it would then be neces
sary to promote policies that would
enable people in the underdeveloped
countries to use their resources and
skills to become food self-reliant."
Being aware that vegetarianism is only
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part of the answer to global hunger, I
address this issue in far' more detail
in my r'ecently published book, Juda
ism and Global Survival.
The matter
of conscience that Gruber fails to
addr'ess is how a per'son can continue
a diet which involves the waste of so
much grain and the importing of beef
fr'om poverty-str'icken countries (the
U.S. leads the world in this t·egard)
when millions of people die of hunger
each year.
Gruber similiarly downplays the
violations of bal tashchit (the Biblical
pt'ohibition
against
wastefulness)
related to meat-centered diets. Since,
as he states, the production of food is
certainly a useful purpose, he is not
bothered by the waste of valuable
productive resou rces associated with
livestock agriculture.
Once again he
asserts that rather than tu rning to
vegetarianism, we should adopt less
wasteful
methods
of
r'aising
and
slaughtering cattle, without explaining
how this can be done in the face of
the hunger of corporations for the
maximization of profits.
Finally Gruber denies the value of
vegetarianism
in· creating a more
peacefu I world.. I n spite of over
whelming evidence, he den ies that
more people wou Id be able to enjoy
the earth's resources jf everyone ate
a vegetarian diet.
He challenges the
idea that vegetarianism helps people to
be more peaceful, compassionate, and
humane by bringing up the ruthless
"vegetarian" Adolph Hitler.
This is
equivalent to condemning all members
of a group, for example, because of
the unethical acts of one member.
For the record, several biographers of
Hitler have commented on his fondness
for several types of meat; Hitler evi
dently was a vegetarian for several
periods of his life to help overcome
the negative hea Ith effects of his gen
eray meat-based diet.
Gruber claims

that

my

extensive

chapter on questions frequently asked
of jewish vegetarians does not answer
the ones raised in his review.
But,
he overlooks my question 15 (page
81),
which,
I
believe,
directly
addresses Gruber's most consistent
argument against my book:
Question:
I nstead of advo
cating vegetarianism, shouldn't
we try to alleviate the eyils of
the factor'y farming system so
that animals are treated better,
less grain is wasted, and less
health-harming
chemical
are
used?
Answer:
The breeding of
animals is a big business,
whose prime concern is p,·ofit.
Animals are raised the way
they are today because
it
increases profits.
Improving
conditions as suggested by this
question would certainly be
strongly resisted by the meat
industry and, if successful,
would greatly increase al ready
high pl'ices.
Here are two counter ques
tions.
Why not abstain from
eating
meat
as
a
protest
against present policies while
trying to improve them? Even
under the best of conditions,
why take the life of a creature
of God, "whose tender mercies
are over all his creatures,"
when it is not necessa ry for
proper nutrition?
His other questions are answered
by the abundance of information in my
book showing the negative effects of
flesh -centered diets with rega I'd to
the
treatment
of animals,
human
health,
world
hunger,
pollution,
waste, and the possibility of war.
Rabbi Gruber is so determined to
argue against vegetarianism that he
ignores the great weight judaism
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traditionally gives to Talmudic sages
and Biblical commentators in explain
ing and clarifying verses of the
Torah.
Hence, when he asserts that
Genesis 1 :29 may not indicate that
people were meant to be vegetarians,
he is disagreeing with the opinion of
countless rabbis and scholars, who
have analyzed the Torah in great
detail.
If this verse were not meant
as a prohibition against eating meat,
why _was it necessary for God to later
give permission to Noah to use animals
for food?
He also distorts several of my
statements related to the Bible.
For
example, he states that I attribute the
reduction in life spans recorded in the
Bible to the change of diet from vege
tarian to meat consuming.
In the
book, I state that this is "a possible
explanation."
He also claims that I
assert that "a carnivorous diet leads
humans to such corrupt practices as
eating limbs torn from living animals."
What I do indicate is that because of
such corrupt practices, as a conces
sion to people's weakness, permission
to eat meat was given to Noah (Gen.
9:3.)
Several
more examples
of
incorrect assertions by Gruber· could
be given.
I do frequently quote great Jewish
authorities throughout the book. This
is to illustrate that the analysis and
opinions are not just mine, but are
based on Jewish tradition, as inter

preted by Jewish scholars.
Without
the support of these great leadet~s,
my arguments would have far less
weight.
I am sorry that Gruber, a long
time vegetarian, is unhappy with my
book. However, Judaism and Vegeta
rianism . has
been
enthusiastically
received (50 favorable reviews), espe
cially by Jewish vegetarians.
Mr.
Philip Pick, the founder of the inter
national "Jewish Vegetarian Society"
wrote the foreword to the book.
A
review in the Jewish Vegetarian called
Judaism and Vegetarianism" ... a bril
liant book of outstanding merit ... a
class ic that should fi nd its way into
every Jewish bookcase and certainly
of interest to all others who love to
widen thei r -knowledge of the ancient
and compassionate philosophies."
Rabbi Gruber starts and ends his
review by stating that I bring out the
correct principles but fail to properly
develop them to convince readers to
become vegeta rians.
I n view of the
many problems related to meat-cen
tered diets, he would do a gt~eat pub
lic service if he would drop his
apparent
anti-vegetarian
bias
and
show us a better way to use Jewish
val ues to convi nce people to adopt
vegetarian diets.
Until he does this,
he appears to be in the position of
one who criticizes without having any
thing better to offer.

Richard H. Schwartz�
Schwartz
College of Staten Island�
Island

IN RE: E&AV/3, White's review of Norton's�
Norton's
"Environmental Ethics and Weak Anthropocentrism"
Anthropocentrism"�
In his review of my "Environmental
Ethics and Weak Anth ropocentrism, "

James E. White
logic of my case.

misunde-rstands the
.He argues that the
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examples I include in order to illus

trate my case at'e not really examples
of anthropocentricaliy based ethics.
Perhaps my examples are not unex
ceptionable. Her'e is not the place to
enter into detailed textual analysis.
My case does not t~est on examples,
but on my analysis and framework of
defi n ition s .

I say that an environmental ethic
wil be "adequate" if it provides a set
of pt'inciples sufficiently strong to
proscribe behaviors "wh ich vi rtually
all environmentally sensitive individu
als agree at'e environmentally destruc
tive." And I a rgue that wea k anth ro
pocentt'ism,
an environmental ethic
that distinguishes between actual felt
pt'eferences (which may be irrational)
and
considered
felt
preferences
(rationally justifiable preferences) is
adequate in this sense.
While the
pursuit of selfish, short.,.term, con
sumptive desi res may lead to the
destruction of nature, a far-sighted
individual with scientific knowledge,
rationally defensible moral ideals, and
a set of preferences consistent with
such a world view would protect
natu re fot~ human t'easons. This pro
tection is essential for the long-term
survival of the human species.
Fur
ther, a rational individual would see
the value of wild species and natural
ecosystems as occasions for the exami
nation and
reformation
of
short
sighted,
selfish,
and
consumptive
materialistic values.
I call the value
of such experiences "transformative."
How badly White misconstrues my
argument is indicated by his conclu
sion that "[weak anthropocentrism]
pl'esents no th reat to advocates of
nona nth ropocentrism, ..
No th reat
was
ever'
suggested or
implied-I
showed that environmental policy mak
ers need not choose between strong
anth ropocentrism,
the
view
that
nature has value only for fulfilling the
demands that our currently misguided
society
registers,
and
nonan
If •

thropocentrism, which posits intrinsic
value for nonhuman species.
That pro-environmental policy mak
ers might wish to avoid this choice is
indicated by the almost complete lack
of theoretical explanation and justi-fj
cation of claims attributing intrinsic
value to nonhumans (see, for examp1le,
the disclaimers listed by Tom Regan in
the "The Nature and Possibility of an
Environmental Ethic,"
Environmental
Ethics 3 (1981), pp. 19-34).
The
bu rden of my case was to show that a
form of anth ropocentrism wh ich places
appropriate weight on human ideals
embedded consistently within a ration
ally
defensible world
view would
include principles adequate to protect
wild species and natural ecosystems.
I intentionally left open the question
of whether nonhuman species or spec
imens have intrinsic value.
I do not
see how such claims can be evaluated
until nonanthropocentrists give a much
clearer explanation of what character
istics indicate and justify such value.
Quite aside from the truth of such
abstract claims, policy makers can
justifiably ask whether philosophers
can justify environmental protection on
some other basis.
Must the develop
ment of an adequate environmental
pol icy wait u nti I ph i losophers resolve
their
internecine
quarrels
about
whether humans are "superior" to
plants and animals and so forth?
(See, for example, Paul Taylor, "Are
Humans
Superior to
Animals
and
Plants?"
Environmental
Ethics
6
(1984), pp. 149-160.) Given the lack
of specificity of, and absence of any
con sens us on, claims of intri nsic val ue
such as Regan's and Taylor's, policy
makers might well fear that humans
will live in an otherwise sterile world
before philosophers agree on a con
cept of intrinsic value sufficiently
justified and precise to determine the
details of environmental policy.
The pu rpose of my

paper was to
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show that proscriptions against envi
ronmental destruction and the genera
tion of a positive envi ronmental policy
need not wait upon these philosophical
developments.
If this argument is
considered a "threat" by nonanthropo
centrists, this may result more from
their embarassment at being unable to
describe adequate principles for envi
ronmental protection
deriving from
their ethical and metaphysical views,
than from my case that environmental
policy
formation
can
proceed
on

another,
equally
adequate
basis.
(See, for example,
Peter Singer's
problems in det~iving fl~om his nonan
thropocentric principles ·any special
obligation to give special treatment to
individual members of nearly extinct
species. "Not for Humans Only: The
Place of Nonhumans in Environmental
Issues," in K. Goodpaster and K.
Sayr~e,

21st

Ethics and the Problems of the
Century (South Bend,
Ind.:

Notre Dame University
p. 203.)

Press,

1979),

B rya n G. Norton�
Norton
New College of the University of South Florida�
Florida

IN RE: This Issue, White's review of Loftin's�
Loftin's
"The Morality of Hunting"
Hunting"�
I agree that hunters are not the
only group working to preserve habi
tat for wildlife. There are many oth
ers, but to subtract hunters (and
fishermen?) from the total social effort
would
have
a
serious
weakening
effect'.
In Florida, where I live, I
have often seen hunters, fishermen,
bird watchers, hikers, campers, and
others work together for en vi ronmen
tal causes such as stopping the Cross
Florida Barge Canal or setting aside
the priceless Guana tract.
Without
the hunters I don't think we could
have prevailed as often as we have.
I don't know what a happy life is
for a White-tailed Deer or a Bobwhite
Quail.
If a happy life means not to
be hunted, no quail will know that
until Red Foxes and Cooper's Hawks
become extinct.
The reviewer seems
to rega rd a "happy life" and a "nor
mal life" for a game animal as the
same. A normal life for a game animal
is to be hunted, and, more often than
not, to die in violence and pain.
If I
had my way, the lives of many more

White-tailed Deer in Florida would end
under the fangs of a Flol'ida Panther.
I would like to see the r~e-establish
ment of the natural predators to con
trol overpopulation among game ani
mals.
That
is
the normal
life.'
Whether it is a "happy" life I cannot
say, but, to quote Aida Leopold, "it
is a poor life that achieves freedom
from fear."
I suppose that by a "happy life"
the reviewer has in mind something
like the lot of the tame ducks that
loiter around the artificial ponds that
grace
many
apartment
complexes.
These animals are not confined, they
hang a rou nd of thei r own accord and
because the apartment dwellers feed
them bread. They are not hunted by
human or natural predators, and they
don't have to work to make a living so
I guess they must lead "happy lives."
All they have to do is eat and bt~eed,
so after a few generations of misce
genation they are an odd lot indeed.
Since natu ral selection is not operat
ing to hone their generic heritage to
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the razor sharpness necessary for
survival in the wild, all sorts of gen
eric oddities a re seen in these motley
assemblases.
Apparently this is the
sort of life that some animals libera
tionists would like to see all animals
lead
(see
Predation"
by
Steve
Sapontzis, Ethics & Animals 5: 27) .
Personally, I r-egard these poor crea
tures as objects of pity mingled with
disgust.
If

I'm not sure about the feasibility of
a sterilization
program to
control
over'population of game animals.
Pre
sumably this would involve capturing
lar-ge numbers of male animals for
vasectomies or someth i ng of the sor't.
Such an effort wou Id be enormously
time consuming and expensive, so at
the present time, I don't think this
solution is technically feasible.
But
the interesting philosophical question
is-Suppose it were?
Lefs imagine a
sterilization drug which worked only
on White-tailed Deer which could be
distributed at low cost simply by
scattering it at salt licks or" broad

casting it from aircra.ft. Would a good
utilitarian prefer this to contr"olling
overpopulation by hunting?
It seems
obvious to me that the answer is yes.
My personal preference would 'be to
foster natural predators, but cheap,
feasible sterilization would be prefera
contro,1 excess popu
ble to hunting to contro'l
lation in those animals that will over
populate and stress the habitat.
The final point the reviewer makes
is that in his honest opinion, the bad
consequences of spo ......tt hunting out
weigh the good consequences.
This
points up what has long been realized
about utilitarianism or any consequen
tialist position-just
how does
one
weigh
the consequences?
Hunters
shoot other hunters (and non-hunt
ers) each year just as swimmers are
drowned each year.
Are the. lives
lost swimming enough to prohibit these
activities?
I don't know of any i ntel
ligent way to answer that question,
which is only to point up the major
weakness of consequentialist ethical
thinking.

Robert W. Loftin�
Loftin
University of North Florida�
Florida

IN RE: This Issue, Sapontzis's review of Callicott's
Callicott's�
"Animal Liberation: A Triangular Affair"
Affair"�

I wrote "Animal Liberation: A Tri
angular Affair" ina bold, swashbuck
ling style precisely in order to attract
the kind of cdtical notice which Steve
F. Sapontzis has given it here.
My
prima ry pu rpose was to d raw a sha rp
distinction between envi ronmental and
animal welfare ethics,
which, before
"A Triangular Affair" appeared, had
been generally (and carelessly) con
fused.
A seconda ry pu rpose was to
draw animal welfare ethicists (a much
larger
contingent
of
professional

philosophers because animal welfare
ethics rest upon much more timid,
conventional
precepts)
into
debate
with environmental ethicists (a much
smaller contingent of professional phi
losophers because environmental ethics
require much more creative ethical
theory building).
At the time it was
written a cozy, essentially internecine
controversy
was
bubbling
along
between
conservative
humanitarian
ethicists
("moral
humanists"
as
I
called them there) like R. G. Frey
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and
liberal
animal
liberationists
("humane moralists") like Tom Regan.
Environmental ethics as such was sim
ply la rgely ignored.
As a philosophical pt'ovocateur, I
have been, if anything, too success
ful.
Before Sapontzis, Edward John
son, William Aiken, Robin Attfield,
Mary Ann Warren, and, in a veiled
sort of way (I suspect so as not to
make it ,more widely known than it
already was), Tom Regan have all
publicly been horrified and outraged
by irA Triangular Affciirlr-p,articulat'ly
by its radical ethical holism. 1
Now
that I have managed to draw attention
to the
really new
and
different
approach to an expanded moral sensi
bility sketched in the land ethic of
Aldo Leopold, I hope soon to detail a
more finely textured
interpretation
and elaboration of it wh ich eschews
the
Irtotal
holism"
(in
Sapontzis'
terms) of my original characterization
or rather caricature.
After all, "a
land ethic," according to Aldo Leo
pold,
"implies
respect for ... fellow
members [of the biotic community] and
also [i.
as well as] respect for the
community as such. "2 I chose not to
emphasize the former, respect for fel
low
members,
in
PIA
Triangular
Affair," so that I might more starkly
highlight the latter, respect for the
community as such-and thus contrast
niore vividly environmental ethics and
animal welfare ethics. The land ethic,
as I think I can show, actually pro
vides a comprehensive moral theory
which will consistently accommodate
(1) humanitarian moral concerns (the
dignity of human individuals and pri
macy of human interests), (2) respect
for non-human individual animals (and
plants as well), and (3) the more hol
istic (and distinctly environmental)
concern
for
populations,
species,
biotic communities, and the global
ecosystem. 3

e.,

According to Sapontzis, "Animal
Liberation:
A Triangular Affair" has

become the '''classic' en vi ronmental
ethics critique of the animal t'ights
movement. Ir If so (and at the risk of
appearing immodest I will not gainsay
it), it can't be as bad a piece of phi
losophy as he ma kes it out to be.
The space allowed me het'e does not
permit a reply to each of the issues
Sapontzi s raises in i nterp I'eti ng and
criticizing it.
I, therefore,
invite
readers of this journal whose interest
has been piqued to read Ir A Tt'iangu'
lar Affair" with an open mind and
evaluate for themselves its conceptual
architettu re and arguments.
In" A Triangula r Affai r" I tried
strictly to maintain a journalistic sep
a ration between myself, as reporter
and commentator and the two philo
sophical movements-envi ronmental and
animal welfare ethics-"-I was comparing
and contrasti ng.
My sympath ies for
Aldo Leopold's land ethic and against
animal welfare ethics were, however,
unconcealed.
Even so, it cannot be
accu rately or fa i rly said that I per
sonally develop there an environmental
ethic or for that matter, that I per:
sonally advocate a philosophy of any
sort as Sapontzis' remarks frequently
imply.
Nowhere, I think, does he distot't
my discussion more than when he says
that I seem to regret that it is impos
sible to return to the Stone Age and
that I favor, among other less noisome
things, infanticide, stylized warfare,
leaving injured wilderness adventurers
to their fate, and sexual continency.
As the page n umbers he cites wi II
reveal, mention of these th i ngswas
scattered and occurred in very differ
ent contexts.
I remark that human
ecologist Garrett Hardin (not I) has
publicly recommended a non - ,.'escue
policy for wilderness excursions and,
not that we ought, but that tribal
people-whose moral views, neverthe
less, might provide val uableperspec
tive on our own~did optimize their
populations by (God forbid) sexual
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conti nency, abortion, i nfa nticide, and
stylized war'fa,.'e.
I will here confess
that I do in fact favor and indeed
practice a personal
regime which
includes a simple (incidentally, vege
tarian) diet and vigorous exercise,
and, speaking just for myself, nor
wishing to impose such a bizarre doc
t I' i n eon any 0 nee Is e , I do i n fa c t
rega rd ch I'on ic ill ness as a wor'se evi I
than death.
But in" A Triangu la r
Affai r" these attitudes and practices
were variously attributed to other
thinkers or other peoples' mores, as
the case may be; they were not
expressly advocated by me.
I don't mind being accused of hav
ing done bad philosophy. The histol'y
of philosophy is a history of philo
sophical er'l'or-otherwise it would al
have come to an end in the one true
view.
The important thing is to go
wrong in interesting 'and provocative
way s .
(J u d gin 9 . by
the
s t ro n g
response so far to "A Triangular
Affair," it went wrong in very crea
tive ways. )
However, I wou Id be
very mOl'tified to have done bad
scholarship-for which I can discover
no similar ,'edeeming virtue. Hence, I
will defend myself directly and specif
ically against Sapontzis' claim that I
have not gotten my Plato right.
To prove that Plato is not a moral
holist-the philosophical antecedent at
the level of social ethics which both
Kenneth Goodpaster and I suggest as
a respectable paradigm for a holistic
environmental ethic-Sapontzis refers
us to the origins of society as specu
1ativey posited by Plato early in the
Republic. 4
Sapontzis infers
that,
since Plato imagines a human commu
nity to arise because each person does
not suffice for his or her own needs
and so associates with others, there
fore (7) Plato regards the common
wealth to exist for the happiness of
its individual constituents severally.
But

we

need

not

deduce

Plato's

views on this point since he later
makes them quite exp,'ess. At the
beginning of Republic IV Adeimantus
complains to Socrates that he (Socra
tes) is "not making these men very
happy."
To which Socrates replies
that "the object on which we fixed our
eyes in the establishment of the state
was ... the greatest happiness of the
city as a whole. "5 And if that does
not prove that Plato espoused moral
holism, still later, in Republic VII,
Socrates refers back to this point and
reiterates it in even stronger terms,
if that is possible.
He says, "You
have forgotten, my friend [Glaucon,
this time], that the law is concerned
not with the special happiness of any
class in the state, but is trying to
pl'oduce this condition' in the whole,
harmonizing and adapting the citizens
to one another by persuasion and
compulsion . .. , not that it may allow
each to take what course pleases him,
but with a view to using them [!] for
the binding together of the common
wealth."6
Sapontzis doesn't attempt to deal
with the other (overwhelming) evi
dence I cite in "A Triangular Affair"
for Plato's "total" (social) holism at
least in the Republic.
So on this
question of how' to read Plato-as a
moral atomist or a moral holist-I must
insist that I am right to think that he
is a holist and Sapontzis is wrong to
think that he is not.
This
seemingly trivial
scholarly
dispute opens onto a larger, much
more
important
question ,
perhaps
really the deepest bone of contention
between Sapontzis and myself, viz.,
what is moral philosophy and what
ought its business to be? Sapontzis
seems to think that moral philosophy
should first construct a rationale for
"currently accepted moral principles
or values"-he cites Kant as an exemp
lar of this approach-and then per
haps-this is apparently the only moral
criticism he thin ks legitimate-poi nt out
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that common practice is hypocritical,
that, in other words, common practice
does not in all domains exemplify the
moral principles or values to which
most people publicly swear allegiance.
In this, Sapontzis affords, I think, a
very illuminating analysis of the gen
er'al program of animal welfare ethics.
Our current culture values equality,
justice, compassion, and the allevia
tion of suffering.
Peter Singer found
a simple rationale for these values in
classical ethical hedonism.
He then
poi nted out that most people tu rn a
blind eye to the extreme hardship and
suffering
imposed
upon
innocent,
equally sentient animals.
This is a
valuable service, which I respect, but
I do not th in k it is the whole or the
only legitimate role of moral philoso
phy.
Sapontizis, on the other hand,
wants somehow to prove that this is
the only legitimate thing a moral phi
losopher can do.
Anything signifi
cantly
deviating
from
"currently
accepted moral principles or values"
would be "merely 'a code for conduct
i n g on e' s I if
ife
e ' [ not] a mo I' a I i ty at a II , "
he claims.
If constructing a rationale for cur
rently accepted moral principles or
values and criticizing only moral prac
tice is all that moral philosophers may
properly do, one wonders whose job it
is to criticize currently accepted moral
principles or values themselves?
Or
does Sapontzis want to rule them
beyond criticism? Are they an impla
cable given?
Surely there is some merit, from
time to time, in taking an intellectu
ally disciplined critical look at cur
rently accepted moral principles or
values themselves and speculatively
advancing alternatives.
If no one
did, or as Sapontzis seems to wish,
no one were allowed to, there would
be no change at all or only an aimless
drift in commonly accepted moral prin
ciples or values.
Plato's moral and
political philosophy is the historical
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exemplar not only of my kind of moral
holism but of my kind of critical,
speculative moral philosophy-if Kant's
is the exemplar of the kind Sapontzis
would impose.
Plato lived in demo
cratic Athens and was
unalter'ably
opposed to democracy.
He was con
sistenty critical of practically all of
the other CLI rrently accepted moral
values of his fellow Athenians: Think
of the devastating par'ody of common
Greek
religious
values
in
the
Euthyphro and the then completely
novel alternative at which it points;
or the critique of curr'ent Athenian
political values and principles of jus
tice-giving
each
his
due;
helping
friends and harming enemies and so
on-i n Republic I, not to mention the
extremely eccentric conception of an
"ideal" community· which follows
in
subsequent books of that dialogue.
But were it not for Plato's wholly
novel and discontinuous moral vision
and that of other speculative moral
ph i losophers, we wou Id not now enjoy
the
advanced
moral
sensibilities
Sapontzis so cherishes.
More generally, Sapontzis ' concep
tion of moral philosophy seems to me
·to be parochial, myopic, and intellec
tually stultifying.
Other contempo
ra r'y cu Itu res accept very differ'ent
moral principles and values.
Mention
of Plato and the ancients reminds us
that very different moral principles
and values prevailed in our own West
ern cu Itu ra I past.
Stone Age peoples
(to whom weare much closer than the
"tens [sic] of thousands of yeal's. of
evolution and history" Sapontzis imag
ines separates us from them) held
very different moral principles and
values than those common in civilized
cu Itu res today.
I th ink that we can
gain a very valuable pel'spective on
- today's currently accepted mOI'al pr'in
ciples and values by seeing them in
this larger historical and cultural con
text.
Finally,

a
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animal liberation is world-denying and
life-loathing.
I have recently come to
think that animal welfare ethics are
appropriate for ou r
relations
with
domestic
animals,
although
as
I
pointed out in "A Triangular Affair,"
if animal liberation prevails and we all
become vegetarians, the only domestic
animals left in any quantity would be
pets.
We would have destroyed farm
animals in ordet~ to have saved them.
If, however,
we extend the princi
ples of animal liberation and animal
,'ights into the wild with ruthless con
sistency,
we
shall
find
ourselves
engaged in a campaign of humane
predator· extermination.
It is ironic
that Steve F. Sapontzis is the per·son
who has most confirmed my darkest
suspicions on this head.
I n an al~ticle
in this jour~nal Sapontzis seriously
entertains the possibility of policing
the wild to prevent vicious carnivo
rous animals from inflicting suffering
and death on innocent herbivorous
animals. 7 Sapontzis doesn't .think that
t'idding the world of predators would
not be a desirable goal or that the
world would be immeasurably impover
ished without predators.
Rather, he
invokes the Kantian principle that
ought implies can and since we cannot
succeed in eliminating predators from
nature it is not our duty to try.8
This is a frighteningly fragile the
oretical barrier to an ecological night
mare.
It overlooks the practical role
of unattainable eth ical
ideals.
We
cannot do lots of things we think we
ought to do-love ou r neighbor as ou rselves, always act as if the maxim of
our action were to become a universal
law of nature, stamp out war, pov
erty, crime.
Still we think we should
try because in trying we may make

some progress toward the ideal.
Similarly,
we may
not be able
humanely to phase out of nature all
wild predators, still we should try
and in tryng we would definitely make
some progress toward that "ideal"-a
natural world that much freer of pain
and violent death, a "better" world in
Sapontzi s' view. We cou Id all too eas
ily succeed completely with the larger,
rat~er predators,
the Bengal Tiger,
the other big cats, wolves, and so
on.
T hi sis w h at I mea n by I if
ife
e -I oath 
ing and world-denying.
Animal liber
ation projected to its logical conclusion
morally condemns the most fundamental
biological facts of life on the planet.
Perhaps, as Sapontzis maintains, mor~
ality requires that we oppose some
natural tendencies and processes, but
can it requi re us to oppose the most
fundamental biological facts of life and
not seem self-contradictory or at the
very least absu rd?
But, asl tried to point out in "A
Triangular Affair," and on this
I
th ink Sapontzis wou Id ag ree, an imal
liberation is the logical extension of
current moral principles and values.
Such internal contradictions and/or
abs u rd ities, therefore, ca II into seri
0us
question either current moral
principles and values and/or their
conventional philosophical justification.
Thus, like it or not, Sapontzis and
other animal
welfare
ethicists are
unwitting contributors to the critical
and speculative sort of· moral philoso
phy which I attempted in "A Triangu
lar Affair" and which he would like to
sweep under the rug.

J. Baird Callicott
University of Wisconsin, Stevens Point
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